The testimony of a 'stanger'

Dr Charles Rowland Bromley Richards has provided us with two books articulating his perspective. Charles Groves Wright Anderson has left us with no comprehensive and coherent account of his life on the ‘Burma Railway’. We have some comments about his experiences preserved for us in Hansard. There are his forwards to R.F. Oakes’ memoirs and those of ‘Cornel Lumiere’. And, we have a few scattered notes from various other sources.

There is one other source of information provided us by the Honorable Charles G. W. Anderson. We have the comments, all too brief, found in the four hours of audio recordings and their transcript which were gathered for the Parliamentary oral history project. These are available through the National Library of Australia. The materials provide us with an invaluable look at the man, his life and his times.

However, they do not linger for long on the prisoner of war years.

Perhaps our most comprehensive and compelling testimony of the character of Colonel Anderson’s leadership as a prisoner of the Japanese derives from Kura! by ‘Cornel Lumiere’. It is an inestimable resource. Or, better, it may well be such a resource. However, there are some difficulties to be sorted out first. In doing this, will I be able to have a care for Cornel’s reputation? I worry about just that.

A third possibility

Captain Richards did understand the strain that he and the other officers were under. At times, their judgment was negatively influenced by this strain. Combined with their various perspectives, this meant that the officers did not always see eye to eye on the appropriate way of dealing with situations. Sometimes, they even said or did things that they would later regret.

Colonel Anderson was the proper military authority. His way of dealing with situations had precedence over all others not supported by military regulations. It was sometimes necessary to swallow your pride as a junior officer and just do as you were told. But, this would be no easy thing. It could leave a foul taste in your mouth for years. You might, in the end, speak your bitterness as a man and not as a doctor.

Thus, you proffer no diagnosis. Instead, you offer an epitaph, “He was mental.”

In the second book, I read the situation in just this way. Therefore, in my opinion, The Survival Factor was the more appropriate articulation of the difficulties. A Doctor’s War may be a personal memoir; but, care must be taken not to treat of the dead unfairly.

Today, fewer people will know about or have access to the testimony of the first book. This is certainly a sad state of affairs. Thus, we are cautioned to call no man ‘happy’ (judged to have lived a truly good life) until he is dead. We recognise that even the circumstances of our dying or of our being dead can conspire against our good name.

Therefore, it becomes the responsibility of the living to take due care with the reputation of the dead. Ensuring the possibility of such care may require access to alternate sources of information. That is especially true of this case; we do need other resources for evaluating the cares and concerns of the protagonists of this drama.

In terms of Colonel Anderson, this is something of a problem.

Two possible answers..both unsatisfactory

In his foreword to the memoir of Roland Frank (Roly) Oakes, Singapore Story, Charles Groves Wright Anderson (15 February 1948:i-ii) made the following observation:

Post mortems and laying the blame are ugly things. A great national disaster such as the fall of Singapore is one that readily invites public demand for enquiry, especially when its importance is enhanced by the critical time at which it occurred; but I would rather hold my judgment until commander’s despatches and Civil authorities’ reports are sifted by the Historian and made known...There are at times in the field of human endeavour conflicting forces operating to bring about conditions that even the wisest and ablest man cannot straighten out. (Emphasis added)

This is both a sound observation and good advice. However, it is not always heeded. In the case of Richards verses Anderson, what are we to make of the doctor’s ‘diagnosis’? I think that there are at least three possible readings that we could consider. Having considered them, I will propose an approach that provides one of the reasons for this ‘digital biography’.

The first possibility goes something as follows. If Captain Richards actually believed that Colonel Anderson truly was mentally ill and a danger to himself and others, then Colonel Anderson should have been relieved of his command. As RMO, the responsibility for taking this action might well have fallen to Captain Richards. He would have, no doubt,  required the support of the other medical officers.

I have been reading and reviewing the various reports and, especially, the diary of Brigadier Varley, for many years. I have also read the official history. I have yet to discover any indication this action was ever taken. There is nothing noted in the portion of Colonel Anderson’s military record available to the public.

So, unless there has been some insidious cover up, it hardly seems credible that such an event had actually occurred. If it had and had been covered up, this would surely be something that Dr Richards would wish to alert the public about. But, he does not mention this.

Of course, there is a second possibility. Captain Richards may have believed that Colonel Anderson was unfit for command at the time. Despite his concerns, Captain Richards may have failed in his duty to report such a circumstance. However, such a failure would hardly be characteristic of Captain Richards. It certainly would not redound to his credit. So, why would he raise it and incriminate himself?

There is a final reading to be considered.